Darwin (MI) : This
week, I participated in the 39th meeting of the Australian Member
Committee of the Council for Security Co-operation in the Asia-Pacific
(Aus-CSCAP) in Darwin. This year’s theme was the US ‘rebalance’ and
Southeast Asia, with a specific focus on the implications for
Australia–Indonesia defence cooperation.
Comprising officials, academics and journalists from both countries, the
discussions were open, frank and refreshing. For me, one of the key
messages during the meeting was that Indonesia increasingly sees defence
cooperation with the US as both a strategic and a tactical asset amid
power shifts in Southeast Asia. My clear impression was that, if push
comes to shove, Jakarta will side with Washington against Beijing’s
attempt to establish a hegemonic position in Southeast Asia.
Much has been made of Indonesian concerns over the US ‘pivot’
announcement in November 2011 and the accompanying decision to rotate US
Marine contingents through bases in northern Australia. However, as
became very clear at the meeting, Jakarta’s criticism of the pivot was
more for domestic consumption than reflecting serious strategic concerns
about the Darwin deployment. In fact, Indonesian participants readily
admitted that Jakarta very much welcomed the pivot for strategic and
tactical reasons.
Strategically, for Indonesia the pivot serves as a reassurance against
unwanted security developments in Southeast Asia, for example Chinese
attempts to enforce its claims in the ‘nine-dashed line’. Recent
incidents involving Indonesian maritime security vessels and illegal
Chinese fishing boats operating within Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ), as discussed here by Scott Bentley on The Strategist, only
add to Jakarta’s concerns that, even though Indonesia isn’t a claimant
state in South China Sea territorial disputes, Beijing’s aspirations
might eventually encroach on Indonesia’s maritime interests. Thus,
behind closed doors some Indonesian analysts describe Beijing as a
potential ‘military threat’ in the longer term.
In this context, the US pivot works for Indonesia, since policymakers
clearly understand that the US isn’t asking them to ‘choose’ between
Washington and Beijing. Rather, it’s a scalable ‘hedging’ strategy
against China’s rise without infringing on Indonesia’s traditional
‘non-alignment’ policy. As well, Indonesian analysts note that
Indonesia’s long-term strategic interests align much closer with those
of the US, Australia and even Japan, which unlike China, share
Indonesia’s interest in the status quo in Southeast Asia. These
countries also recognise Jakarta’s emergence as a regional major power
and a natural leader in ASEAN, while Indonesia increasingly regards
China as attempting to ‘divide and conquer’ the organisation. Finally,
it matters to Indonesia that these countries share universal democratic
values as well as common ideas about international norms and behaviour.
In short, there’s a distinct lack of ‘strategic confidence’ in China’s
intentions.
In addition, the Indonesian military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI)
regards increased US military presence in the region as a positive.
Since it’s still too weak to defend Indonesia’s littoral approaches
against a major military power, TNI welcomes America’s military
(re-)engagement in Southeast Asia; recognising that this posture is
still fairly limited and focused on rotational deployments, not
permanent bases. TNI also appreciates the role the US military can play
in supporting its very ambitious plans to become a major regional player
over the next two decades or so. Washington isn’t only attractive as a
supplier of sophisticated military platforms, such as the recent deal on
the delivery of eight Boeing AH-64 Apache attack helicopters. The US
also funded and put in place Indonesia’s Integrated Maritime
Surveillance System (IMMS), which is located to cover the Malacca
Strait, Sulawesi Sea and Moluccas Strait. The IMMS consists of 18
coastal surveillance stations, 11 ship-based radars, two regional
command centres and two fleet command centres. The US also provided
US$4.6 million to ensure sustainment until 2014. Finally, senior TNI
leaders acknowledge that closer defence cooperation with the US will
help to turn military platform acquisitions into actual military
capabilities. Interaction with the US Marines in Darwin as part of the
development of TNI’s amphibious capability is one such element.
All of this doesn’t mean that Indonesia is already actively ‘balancing’
against China. It’s still trying to ‘navigate in more turbulent waters’,
as one participant put it, by cooperating with both the US and China.
This includes the military domain, where for example Jakarta has reached
an agreement with Beijing to locally produce the Chinese C-802 cruise
missile which is fitted on the TNI’s large patrol craft. However, should
China continue to push the strategic envelope in Southeast Asia, it’s
very likely that Indonesia will not only push back but will also
increase its strategic cooperation with the US.
This is predominantly good news for Australia. Strategically, it means
that our American ally will become more involved in helping Indonesia to
realise its regional power potential. A stronger Indonesia will provide
Australia with greater strategic depth amid the uncertainties of power
shifts in Asia. That said, it’s more important than ever for Australia
to prepare for a future in which Indonesia is much stronger than has
been the case previously, and is increasingly willing and able to pursue
its own strategic interests.
Sumber : Aspistrategist
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